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Abstract. The proliferation of incompatible e-commerce systems applying dif-
ferent security technologies imposes difficult choices on all the concerned parties.
In this context, the purpose of this research is to provide the necessary back-
ground to develop a security advisor (SecAdvise), which will make it possible to
integrate the security mechanisms and the dynamic selection of the various mech-
anisms between several parties wishing to conduct business transactions safely.
Such an advisor aims multiple goals: overcoming compatibility and interoperabil-
ity problems, evaluating and reducing technological security risks, and enhancing
trust.
1 Introduction
The Internet is becoming an increasingly important channel for e-commerce where
complex business interactions involve multiple parties. Clearly, the safety of the trans-
actions using electronic means is of capital importance. Several security systems have
been implemented [1, 4, 9] and are operational in many e-commerce applications. The
mechanisms employed, the security services, the cryptographic algorithms, the amount
of money involved in a transaction, the parties concerned, etc, distinguish these security
systems. In this context, the purpose of this research project is to analyze the various
types of security threats, mechanisms and services in e-commerce applications, to eval-
uate them, qualify them, and develop sound methods to select the most appropriate and
effective mechanisms and services in a given business and technology context. The re-
sults of these investigations will provide the necessary background to develop a security
advisor, which will make it possible to integrate the mechanisms and the dynamic se-
lection of the various mechanisms between several parties wishing to conduct business
transactions safely. Such an advisor aims multiple goals: overcoming compatibility and
interoperability problems, reducing technological security risks, and enhancing trust.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, an introduction to security
threats, services and mechanisms is given. This analysis should provide us with a ba-
sic understanding of the relationship between risks, services, and mechanisms. We also
try to understand the link between security services, mechanisms and the layers of the
OSI (Open Systems Interconnection) reference model [2]. Section 3 describes a trust
management model developed in [8]. Our advisor is introduced in Section 4. Finally,
Section 5 contains some conclusions and future research directions.
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2 Security Issues
In [5], Vesna Hassler has identified three principal issues of security: security threats,
security services, and security mechanisms. Attacks on systems can be classified in
several types:
– Eavesdropping. Intercepting and reading messages intended for other principles.
– Masquerading. Sending/receiving messages using another principal’s identity.
– Message tampering. Intercepting and altering messages intended for other princi-
pals.
– Replaying. Using previously sent messages to gain another principal’s privileges.
– Infiltration. Abusing a principal’s authority in order to run hostile or malicious pro-
grams.
– Traffic analysis. Observing the traffic to/from a principal.
– Denial-of-service. Preventing authorized principals from accessing various resour-
ces.
This classification leads to a thorough analysis of the most probable threats and of
the system’s vulnerabilities to these threats. On the basis of the risk analysis results, we
can define a security policy that clearly specifies what must be secured. The functions
that enforce the security policy are referred to as security services.
We mention the basic security services defined by the International Organization
for Standardization. Whenever possible, we also identify in which layer of the OSI
reference model [2] these services may be applied. This relationship between services
and OSI reference model layers has already been established in [5], on which we base
this classification.
– Authentication. Different authentication services are available. Peer entity authen-
tication ensures that a communicating party is really what he claims to be (network
layer). Data origin authentication delivers proofs that a piece of information origi-
nates from a certain source (network layer).
– Access control. Access control ensures that only authorized principals can gain
access to protected resources.
– Data confidentiality. Data confidentiality can be of different types. To ensure con-
fidentiality between two communicating parties that establish a communication
channel, a connection confidentiality service is employed (physical layer). If the
communication channel is only logical, the service is referred to as connection-
less confidentiality (data link layer). If only certain parts of messages to be ex-
changed must be protected, a selective field confidentiality service is used (appli-
cation layer). Traffic flow confidentiality protects against traffic analysis (physical
layer).
– Data integrity. Similar to data confidentiality services, data integrity services are
different for connection-oriented and connectionless protocols. For connection ori-
ented protocols they may provide message recovery (transport layer). Data integrity
services can also protect selected fields of messages only.
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– Non-repudiation. According to the ISO, non-repudiation services can prevent den-
ial-of-origin of data or guaranty the delivery of data. There are two additional possi-
bilities: non-repudiation of submission and non-repudiation of receipt (application
layer).
Security services are built using combinations of security mechanisms. These mech-
anisms are in turn realized by cryptographic algorithms and secure protocols. Here is a
summary of the security mechanisms available, as described in [5].
– Encryption. Encryption mechanisms protect the confidentiality of data. We dis-
tinguish two types of mechanisms: symmetric mechanisms (e.g., Data Encryption
Standard – DES; Advanced Encryption Standard – AES) and public key mecha-
nisms (e.g., RSA).
– Digital signature. A digital signature can be generated by a special digital signature
mechanism as well as by a combination of encryption mechanisms.
– Authentication exchange. Authentication can be based on an encryption mecha-
nism, symmetric or public. Therefore, several mechanisms have been developed
whose only purpose is authentication exchange (for example, zero-knowledge pro-
tocols and Kerberos, a key distribution system).
– Access control. Access control mechanisms are closely related to authentication.
They deal with controlling access of the subjects to the divers resourses.
– Data integrity. Data integrity mechanisms protect data from unauthorized modi-
fication. One way to protect data integrity is to use an encryption mechanism. In
this way, data integrity and data confidentiality are ensured. Another way to en-
sure integrity is to use a digital signature mechanism. In this case, integrity and
non-repudiation are ensured. If integrity is required without confidentiality or non-
repudiation, message digests computed by a cryptographic hash function can be
used (e.g., SHA-1, MD5). The message authentication code (MAC) can ensure au-
thentication and data integrity.
– Traffic padding. Traffic padding mechanisms keep traffic approximately constant,
so that no one can gain information by observing it.
– Routing control. Routing control mechanism makes it possible to choose a specific
path for sending data through a network, hence avoiding undesirable nodes.
– Notarization. Notarization mechanisms are provided by a third party notary that
must be trusted by all the participants.
– Key management. For the public key encryption, key management and certification
authorities are a must.
As is the case with security services, security mechanisms may also be used at
different layers of the OSI reference model. To illustrate this, we give a short list of
well-known security mechanisms and the corresponding layer to which they apply.
– Application layer: S/MIME, S-HTTP, Secure TELNET.
– Presentation layer: Secure RPC, SASL, SSH.
– Transport layer: SSL, TLS.
– Network layer: IP AH, IP ESP.
– Data link layer: Link encryption, MAC address filtering.
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The list of services and mechanisms above is not exhautive. In fact, specific contexts
require the development of specialized security services. To illustrate this point, we
present here some security services developed for electronic payment. Note that most
of these services are provided at the OSI reference model application layer.
– User anonymity and location untraceability. These services guaranty that althought
the merchant received payment for the goods sold, he cannot identify the buyer.
These services may be provided, for example, by chains of mixes [3] and blind
signature mechanisms. Another form of this service is the payer anonymity service
provided in FV (First Virtual) [7].
– Non-repudiation of payment transactions. This service ensures that a payer cannot
deny having made de the payment. An example of this service is found in the 3KP
payment protocol, using digital signatures [9].
– Confidentiality of payment transaction. This service prevents eavesdropping on
payment data. This type of service is provided by SET (Secure Electronic Transac-
tion) citeSher00a.
– Freshness of payment transaction. This service prevents replay attacks on payment
transactions. One approach to provide this service is the use of time stamps such as
in the 1KP model [9].
When the payment instrument is digital money, the list of services includes protec-
tion against double spending, protection against forging of coins, and protection against
steeling of coins. When electronic checks are the payment instrument, other types of
services are necessary. For instance, payment authorization transfer (proxy) makes it
possible to transfer a payment authorization from one authorized principal to another.
3 A Trust Management Model
Several initiatives, such as Semper [6], tried to have the various electronic payment
systems converge in order to work out a common operating platform and assure in-
teroperability between them. Robles et al. [8] propose a trust model for agent-oriented
electronic business applications. This trust model outlines a methodology to define trust
requirements and to associate safeguards with them to increase the protection and trust
of electronic business frameworks. It suggests the definition of a trust problem space
(TPS) as a set of all possible situations in the system, in which the e-commerce agents
can have trust problems about each other or about the environment (a set of the threats
and risks mentioned in Section 2). This space includes various types of attacks, and
vulnerabilities due to cheating or misuse of system resources. This TPS is related to a
collection of interrelated mechanisms, trust units (TU), to provide safeguards to protect
systems and sub-systems, and to increase the trust in the systems or sub-systems. A TU
is a trust logical unit representing a partial or complete solution or countermeasure to
any of those problem subspaces presented in the definition of the trust problem space.
It may involve cryptographic protocols (RSA, DSE), control mechanisms or infrastruc-
tures.
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4 Secadvise Definitions
We intend to develop an optimization model, enabled by a security advisor, to
1. identify and specify the Trust Problem Space (TPS) and the Trust Units (TU) avail-
able in the context of a communication to be secured, and
2. make the optimal association between TPS and TU to actually secure that commu-
nication.
We provide here a preliminary version of the optimization model:
c transaction to secure. It is the business context/transaction that is performed and that
need security.
U the set of all trust units (TU). A trust unit may be a security mechanism, a security
protocol or a security infrastructure.
u a trust unit (u 2 U).
R the set of all non-decomposable security risks, such that 8r 2 R;8u 2 U, either u
covers r entirely or u does not cover r at all.
r a non-decomposable security risk (r 2 R).
P the set of all potential participants in secured communications.
p a participant (p 2 P).
R
u
the set of security risks covered by trust unit u (R
u
2 P(R)).
R
c
the set of security risks that need to be covered in transaction/context c (R
c
2
P(R)). These are the Trust Problem Spaces (TPS) defined above.
P
c
the set of all participants directly communicating in transaction/context c (P
c
2 P(P)),
e.g., host A wants to communicate with hosts B.
A
u;p
the set of participants, trusted by participant p, that can act as third party authority
in conducting trust unit u (u 2 U, p 2 P, A
u;p
2 P(P)), e.g., the set of certifi-
cation authorities trusted by a participant. If the trust unit does not require such
trusted third party, A
u;p
= P to simplify the matching process between trust units.
U
p
the set of trust units available to a participant p 2 P (U
p
2 P(U)).
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The setR is defined as the set of non-decomposable risks. Clearly, defining that set
is not a simple task. However, we argue thatR may be constructed. Assuming that we
find a trust unit u such that risk r is partially covered by u, we can always define risks
r
0 and r00, with r0 [ r00 = r and r0 \ r00 = ;, such that r0 is covered entirely by u and
r
00 is not covered at all by u.
This said, in order to avoid such ad hoc decompositions, we intend to provide a pre-
liminary multidimensional classification of risks. Two of the dimensions would be the
set of risks identified in Section 2 and the seven layers of the OSI reference model [2].
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5 Conclusion and Future Work
The proposed model is an interoperable architecture for the various e-commerce secu-
rity systems. The advisor will choose the best subspace solution for a given security
context, depending on the available mechanisms. Regardless of the kind of the mech-
anisms, the advisor will assess minimum and acceptable security for the transactions
between the various parties wishing to conduct safe business transactions. In addition,
the advisor should facilitate the assessment of the trustworthiness of security mecha-
nisms and services, providing a systematic evaluation framework based on the multidi-
mensional risk classification. In the foreseeable future, a detailed classification of the
mechanisms will be available which will conduct the trustworthiness of these mech-
anisms. This classification will help to demonstrate the applicability of the approach.
Moreover we will choose a number of mechanisms to test the architecture/advisor. We
will also define standard scenarios to implement and test the system.
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